ARCC Letter to Brooks B. Yeager

Re: UNEP POPs Negotiations

September 22, 2000

Brooks B. Yeager
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environment
Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
United States Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Deputy Assistant Secretary Yeager:

On behalf of the Alliance for the Responsible Use of Chlorine Chemistry (ARCC), an alliance of major American unions and companies, we are contacting you with regard key sections of the current UNEP negotiating draft on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), including by-products.

As we noted in our letter to you dated February 10, 2000 (copy attached), the DOS historically has fairly represented the democratic balance of interests of U.S. workers, companies and communities before UNEP. The DOS's historic position on the issue of by-product POPs has been agreed upon as part of an informed and democratic interagency process of government. Based on this process, the DOS has advocated that creation of by-product POPs by human activity should be continuously reduced and strictly controlled.

This risk management approach faithfully mirrors U.S. law and policy. For the U.S., it has succeeded in dramatically reducing POPs emissions and exposures while preserving jobs and production. It is a working model for the world to follow. It achieves POPs reduction without inflicting adverse economic consequences on productive industries employing millions of workers worldwide.

The international goal of continuing to reduce POPs emissions and exposures by application of best available technology (BAT) is one that all nations can support and one that industry can achieve. ARCC supports the use of BAT to either reduce or eliminate (where appropriate) emissions and exposures. This approach sets achievable targets, further reducing POPs. However, Article D.3 Chapeau contains unrealistic language calling for an aspirational goal of elimination of by-product POPs.

We are particularly concerned by language binding signatory governments to promote and under certain conditions require the use of "substitute" materials, products or technologies "instead of those which release or have the potential to release by-product substances" (Article D.3.b).

It is our position that U.S. negotiators should require D.3.b. to focus on pollution prevention (e.g. maintenance, process improvements, housekeeping, etc.) and not on substitution. Use of the word "substitute" could send an unintended signal to markets that a whole class of beneficial, safe and cost-effective products should be replaced - creating a disadvantage for U.S. workers, companies and communities. This misguided approach mistakenly assumes that:

1. better cost-effective "substitutes" exist but somehow are not in use;
2. POPs risk management and reduction programs do not work; and
3. the risk of using unspecified "substitute" materials, if available, is not greater.

We believe D.3.b creates another kind of problem as well. Uncoordinated action by governments would bestow artificial competitive advantages or disadvantages on producers in different countries. One government could encourage or require the use of substitutes, while another might not in order to protect its domestic industry.

In addition, we are concerned about a number of issues in Annex C. mainly Section II.2.g. Our concerns include:

1. The parties have not had sufficient time to review the Annex;
2. POPs by-products in these processes are generally isolated in the waste streams. The Convention needs to focus on BAT for waste management, not on the processes; and
3. In Section II.2.g.v, the statement on production of vinylchloride is incorrect as written: (a) ethylene dichloride (EDC), not vinylchloride, is produced by oxychlorination; (b) EDC is not the only product produced by oxychlorination; (c) oxychlorination is a process developed to use waste hydrochloric acid from other processes, not to dispose of it; and (d) ECD is made by two "parallel" processes - direct chlorination and oxychlorination. A producer using direct chlorination alone would be at a severe competitive disadvantage.

In addition, we believe that the definition of the phrase "precautionary principle" used in the negotiating text should be the same as the definition agreed by the Rio Convention.

In addressing the POPs challenge, we ask that the U.S. negotiators continue to stress the successful approach of technology-based management. This is the best way to further reduce POPs while maintaining good U.S. jobs and beneficial investments.

Sincerely,